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The Innocence Protection Act: Why Federal
Measures Requiring Post-Conviction DNA Testing
and Preservation of Evidence are Needed in Order
to Reduce the Risk of Wrongful Executions
"I believe there are cases where the death penalty is appropriate. But we've got to make sure we have the right person.
Every governor who holds this power has the same fear I do. "1
PART I: INTRODUCTION

Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, 731 men and
women have been executed in the United States 2 , including fortyeight prisoners put to death from January through August of 2001
alone. 3 During this time, ninety-six people 4 - more than one out
5
of every 100 people sentenced to death in the United States have been exonerated after spending years in prison or on death
row for crimes they did not commit. 6 Of these exonerations, eighty1 Statement by George Ryan, Republican Governor of Illinois, who, in January of 2000 imposed a moratorium on capital punishment after 13 men were released from death row after proving they were wrongly convicted. Jonathan
Adler, NEWSWEEK, The Death Penalty on Trial, June 4, 2000 at 3, 7, available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/418243.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
2 See Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
dpicexec.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
3 See Brooke A. Masters, Executions Decrease for the 2"d Year; Va., Texas
Show Sharp Drops Amid a National Trend, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2001, at A01.
4 See Hearing on Protecting the Innocent. Ensuring Competent Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 1 07 1hCong. (1S Sess. 2001) (statement of Patrick Leahy, Senator, Vermont). See also Raymond Bonner, Death Row Inmate is Freed After DNA
Test Clears Him, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at All.
5 See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before
the House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 106th Cong. (2 "d Sess. 2000) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Honorable William D. Delahunt, Representative, Massachusetts). See also Rhonda McMillion, Pulling the Plug on Executions: ABA's Call
for Death Penalty Moratorium Sparks Debate in Congress, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at
99.
6 See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt). See
also Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/9nov/
9911wrongman.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001) (explaining that "[t]he reasons for
these miscarriages of justice range from simple police and prosecutorial error to
the most outrageous misconduct, such as the framing of innocent people, and eve-
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two people, including ten on death row, were proven innocent by
post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid testing (hereinafter referred
to as "DNA testing"). 7 In at least seventeen of the exonerations,
DNA testing not only proved the innocence of convicted men and
8
women, but also led to the identification of the real perpetrators.
While these figures may indicate that our judicial system may
be on the right track in utilizing DNA technology in criminal cases,
the truth is that many convicted men and women request DNA testing every year to prove their innocence, but their requests are denied due to post-conviction evidentiary time restrictions. 9 In almost
half of the post-conviction exonerations based on DNA evidence,
state prosecutors refused to release evidence for DNA testing until
litigation was threatened or initiated. 10 Prisoners who are forced to
litigate in order to obtain DNA testing face an average delay of 4.5
years, increasing the likelihood that biological evidence will be lost
or destroyed.11
rything in between: perjured testimony, erroneous eyewitness testimony, false confessions (including the confessions of innocent defendants), racial bias,
incompetent defense counsel, and overzealous police officers and prosecutors who
may or may not genuinely believe that they have the perpetrator of a heinous
crime").
7 See Mark Hansen, The Great Detective, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 37, 42-44.
See also Kay Lazar, Tiny Evidence Changing the Face of the Criminal Justice System, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 24, 2000, at 8 (explaining that Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) is a cellular acid that carries a person's genetic code). See also Andrew
Olivastro, DNA Testing Creates Second Chances, at http://www.policy.com/news/
dbrief/dbriefarc695.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2000) (stating that if a person's DNA
does not match the DNA left in biological evidence left at a crime scene, he or she
may be exonerated).
8 See Hearing Before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, FinancialManagement and Intergovernmental Relations:DNA Technologies, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (statement of Barry C.
Scheck, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
9 See The Innocence ProtectionAct of 2000: Hearings on S.2073 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 106" Cong. (21d Sess. 2000) (statement of Bryan Stephenson, Executive Director, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama). See also JIM
DWYER, PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS
TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED

218 (2000) (stating that "[I]n thirty-three states, any claim of innocence based on
new evidence must be brought to court within six months of the final appeal. Only
seven states permit the motion at any time" ).
10 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at xvi.
11 See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on S.2073 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 106"' Cong. ( 2 nd Sess. 2000) (statement of Peter
Neufeld, Co-Director, Innocence Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law;
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In order to stop this injustice, a bi-partisan bill called the Innocence Protection Act of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act")
has been introduced to the Senate and to the House of Representatives. 12 The Act is a collection of measures aimed at reducing the
imprisonment and execution of innocent people. 13 The Act would
apply to all federal inmates and would require all states to either
adopt the provisions set forth in the Act or create similar legislation
of their own. 14 States refusing to comply would do so at the risk of
15
losing grants for DNA programs.
Commissioner, New York State Forensic Science Commission; co-author,
INNOCENCE).
12 S.486, 1 07 h

t

ACTUAL

Cong. (P Sess. 2001) introduced to the Senate on March 7,
introduced to the Senate during the 10 6 h Cong. (2 nd
originally
was
486
2001 (S.
Sess. 2000) as S.2073, by Senator Patrick Leahy, D-VT on February 10, 2000), and
H.R. 912, 107" Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) introduced to the House on March 7, 2001
(H.R. 912 was originally introduced to the House during 106"h Cong. ( 2 d Sess.
2000) by Congressman William D. Delahunt, D-MA on April 4, 2000).
13 See Amy Worden, Crime Bill Pushed in Last Month of Congress; APB
Online, Inc., available at www.apbonline.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) (stating
"[tihe Innocence Protection Act ... [is] a package of reforms aimed at reducing
the risk of wrongful execution. It would allow convicted offenders to prove their
innocence through DNA testing, help states provide competent legal services and
enable those who prove their innocence to receive compensation for their
incarceration").
14 See David E. Rovella, Fixing the Penalty: Democrats Push DNA Testing
Bill to Prevent Wrongful Executions, but GOP is Wary; NAT'L L.J., Vol. 22, No. 44,
June 26, 2000, at Al. Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to enact laws in order to enforce its constitutionally
vested powers. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, cl.18. If Congress is seeking an objective
that is within the specifically enumerated powers, then Congress can use any
means that is (1) rationally related to the objective Congress is trying to achieve;
and (2) it must not violate any specific constitutional provision. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (explaining that Congress may not enact legislation in order to regulate a general police power). See e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (stating that Congress may use its taxing and spending powers to
"provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States .. ").U.S.
CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has held that Congressional conditions placed upon the distribution of federal funds to the states is usually justified
under the Necessary and Proper clause. See e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987) (holding that the withholding of federal highway funds from states that
allow individuals under the age of twenty-one to purchase or possess alcoholic
beverages is a permissible use of Congress' spending power).
15 See A Real Crime Bill, WASH. PosT, July 3, 2001, at A18. See also Bruce
Alpert, Congress May Mandate Use of DNA Tests in Some Criminal Cases, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 29, 2000 (stating that under "Leahy's bill, states could
lose federal grants if they either deny reasonable requests for DNA testing that
could produce evidence of guilt or innocence or if they don't adopt adequate pro-
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A significant portion of the Act deals with DNA testing, nota-

bly providing post-conviction DNA testing to inmates and ensuring
the preservation of biological evidence for the term of an inmate's
sentence.'16 This Note will focus on the proposed legislation regarding these issues. Part II discusses the history and background of the
Act. Part III illustrates the effect the Act will have on current federal law. Part IV describes the effect the Act will have on current
state law. Part V explains why it is necessary and proper for federal
legislation to be enacted to ensure that the federal government and
the states will take the appropriate steps in allowing post-conviction
DNA testing and the preservation of biological materials. Part VI
examines the effect of similar legislation currently enacted in states
such as New York, Illinois and California. Part VI also explores
recent legislation passed in Texas and Virginia - two states that
have staunchly maintained the strictest post-conviction laws in the
country.

cedures for preserving DNA material"). Because of the increasing use of DNA
testing in crime solving, the availability of federal funds is paramount. As of June,
2001, all fifty states have enacted statutes that require the collection of DNA from
persons convicted of sex crimes; thirty-four states require the collection of DNA
from persons convicted of serious crimes, in addition to sex crimes; twenty-six
states have laws requiring DNA to be collected from juvenile offenders; eighteen
states have access to the FBI's DNA index; and last year, at least nine states
changed their DNA collection statues to include most crimes. Hearing Before the
House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government EJfficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations: DNA Technologies, 1 07 th Cong. (1St Sess. 2001) (statement of Mike Lawlor, Representative, Chair
of Judiciary). Due to increased testing, many states have turned to the federal
government for help. For example, last year, California, Florida, Minnesota, New
York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington were the recipients of more that $7
million from the U.S. Department of Justice for DNA sample analysis.). Id.
16 H.R. 912, tit. I; S. 486, tit. I. See also Joe Volk, Executive Secretary of The
Friends Committee on National Legislation; Letter to Sens. Feinsteinand Schumer:
Support the Innocence Protection Act, Sept. 15, 2000, available at http://
www.fcnl.org/issues/cri/sup/deathfeinstein.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2000) (stating
that ". . . [t]he Innocence Protection Act's broader language with regard to DNA
evidence would provide more protection for the innocent. Defendant's would be
able to request DNA evidence that 'may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim of the applicant that the applicant was wrongfully convicted or sentenced' . . . [and] calls for the preservation of 'any biological material
secured in connection with a criminal case for such period of time as any person
remains incarcerated in connection with that case'.").
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While the Act's requirement for state compliance may be considered a broad act of federalism, 17 its measures are necessary in
order to protect innocent people from wrongful convictions and executions.18 Although several states have adopted measures similar
20
to those proposed in the Act, 19 the flat-out refusal by some states

to recognize or create similar legislation makes it clear that federal
intervention is needed to reduce the risk of incarcerating or execut21
ing innocent people.
PART

II:

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE

INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT

In 1997, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted a report from the ABA Section of Individual Rights

and Responsibilities and called for a nationwide moratorium on the
death penalty. 22 Furthermore, the ABA urged the federal government and the thirty-eight states with the death penalty to tempora17
See e.g., 30 Attorneys General Sign Letter Expressing DNA Testing Bill
Concerns; National Association of Attorneys General Home Page, at http://
www.naag.org/legislation/june/dna.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
18
The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before the
House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 10 6th Cong. 2nd Sess. (2000) (statement of
Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General), 2000 WL 19304895 (stating that
"[w]hile I appreciate and respect the federalism concerns raised by my colleagues
in state government, DNA testing is too important to allow some states to offer no
remedy to those incarcerated who may be innocent of the crimes for which they
were convicted"). It should also be noted that, according to a Newsweek poll,
almost 90% of Americans support the idea of federal guarantees of DNA testing.
Adler, supra note 1.
19 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Eliot Spitzer), (describing
New York Criminal Procedure Law §440.30 as authorizing New York trial courts
to order post-conviction DNA testing when it determines that: 1) the evidence
containing DNA was secured in connection with the trial resulting in the judgment;
and 2) that if a DNA test had been concluded on such evidence that the results had
been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, "there exists a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant").
20 See Daniel B. Wood, DNA Testing: No Longer Just for Prosecutors,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 18, 2000, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/
2000/09/18/p3sl.htm, (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). Seven states, including Delaware,
Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey and South Dakota have rejected legislation guaranteeing inmate access to DNA testing. Robert Tanner,
States are Slow to Grant DNA Testing to People Seeking to Prove Innocence, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 2000, at A10.
21 See generally, Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stephenson).
22 Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, ABA's Proposed Moratorium:

The Execution of the Innocent; 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1998). See also
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rily halt executions until they could ensure fairness in capital cases

and reduce the risk of executing the innocent. 23 The ABA's motion
was supported by twenty former ABA presidents - many of whom
24

considered themselves death penalty supporters.
On January 31, 2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan, citing Illinois' "shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting
them on death row,"' 25 imposed the nation's first moratorium on
executions. 26 Governor Ryan, a death penalty proponent,2 7 announced his decision after thirteen men were exonerated and freed

from death row in Illinois. 28 These thirteen men represented more
than half of all death penalty sentences in Illinois since the state
reinstated capital punishment in 1977.29 Explaining his decision to
issue the moratorium, Governor Ryan stated that he was no longer

able to "support a system which, in its administration, has proven so
fraught with error, and has come so close to the ultimate
30
nightmare."
Mark Hansen, More for Moratorium: ABA Conference Bolsters Momentum to
Halt Executions, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 92.
23 See Sara Rimer, Support for a Moratorium In Executions Gets Stronger:
Growing Number of Cities Express Unease, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A-18.
See also McMillion, supra note 5.
24 Radelet & Bedau, supra note 22, at 105.
25 Morton Mintz, #15 Mort Wants to Know: Death Penalty Madness Shouldn't the Press Be Asking Hard Questions About Death Row In-Justice?, at
http://www.tompaine.com/news/2000/03/17/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
26
27

Id.

Adina Yoffie, Fatal Error. The State of the US Death-Penalty System, at
http://www.princeton.edu/-progrev/99-00/n7-ay.html (visited Oct. 5, 2000)
28 Mintz, supra note 25. In addition to the release of thirteen prisoners from
death row, Ryan was also concerned with the findings of an investigation of the
Chicago Tribune. The investigation found that thirty-three death row inmates in
Illinois had been represented at trial by an attorney who had been disbarred;
thirty-five African-American death row inmates had been convicted by all white
juries; and that jailhouse informants were used to convict or condemn forty-six
death row inmates. See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000. Hearings on H.R.
4167 Before the House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 10 6th Cong. (2 d Sess. 2000)
(statement of Governor George H. Ryan, State of Illinois). Interestingly, five of
the men released from death row were not set free because of a properly working
judicial system. Instead, their freedom was due to a group of Northwestern University journalism students who, while working with an investigator, found evidence of the men's innocence. See Berlow, supra note 6.
29 See Mintz, supra note 25.
30 Id. Unfortunately, the "ultimate nightmare" has occurred in the United
States - possibly several times. One study has shown that 23 innocent people
have been executed in the United States during the 20' century, including one in
1984. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
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The day after Governor Ryan issued the moratorium, Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) announced that he would introduce "the
first federal legislation to address denials of fundamental fairness in
the administration of capital punishment."' 31 Ten days later in the
Senate, on February 10, 2000, Senator Leahy introduced S. 2073,
The Innocence Protection Act of 2000.32 On April 4, 2000, Con-

gressmen William Delahunt (D-MA) and Ray LaHood (R-IL) introduced H.R. 4167 - also called The Innocence Protection Act to the House of Representatives. 33 By the end of the 1 0 6th Congress, the Act had not been submitted to a vote in either the Senate
or House. The Act was reintroduced to the 1 0 7Th Congress as S. 486
34
and H.R. 4167 on March 7, 2001.
The legislation proposed by the Act "arose out of a growing
national awareness that the machinery by which capital cases [are
tried] in this country has gone seriously awry."' 35 In the Act, the
drafters made several findings that proved that there were serious
problems with the current federal and state systems of criminal justice. 36 Notably, the Act points out that in most states, a motion for
STAN. L. REV., 21, 36, 173-179 (1987) and M. RADELET, H. BEDAU & C. PUTNAM,
IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, 282-356 (1992). See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,

431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Not all people see the execution of an innocent person as the ultimate nightmare. See Edward Pratt, DNA Testing is a Good
Move, STATE TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE , May 27, 2000, at 7-B (stating that
"there are people such as U.S. Rep. Bill McCollum, a Florida Republican, who say
a tiny percentage of those who are executed might be innocent, but that is a price
worth paying for an effective death penalty").
31 Mintz, supra note 25.
32 Id.
33 Yoffie, supra note 27.
34 S. 486, 107 Cong. (1"' Sess. 2001); H.R. 912, 107 Cong. (1"t Sess. 2001).
Note that as S. 486 and H.R. 912 will be referred to collectively as "The Act".
35 Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt ). See
also James Leibman, A Broken System: ErrorRates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionservices/liebman/ (last visited Nov. 4,
2000) (finding that the courts found reversible error in 68% of all capital cases
tried in the United States. When these individuals were retried, 82% were found
not to deserve the death penalty and 7% were found innocent of the capital crime
altogether. "Our 23 years worth of results reveal a death penalty system collapsing
under the weight of its mistakes. They reveal a system in which lives and public
order are at stake, yet for decades has made more mistakes then we would tolerate
in far less important activities. They reveal a system that is wasteful and broken
and needs to be addressed.").
36 S. 486, tit. I, § 101; H.R. 912, tit. I, § 101.
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a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of innocence must
37
be filed within three years or less of conviction.
The strict evidentiary laws imposed by the states are correlated
to the growing pressure on the judicial system to reduce frivolous
appeals and speed up executions. 38 Over the past decade, the Supreme Court, Congress, and several states have moved to expedite
39
executions by making appeals more difficult if not impossible.
For example, before Virginia abolished its time limit during which a
prisoner may introduce post-conviction DNA evidence, a prisoner
wishing to present such evidence had do so within 21 days of his or
her conviction. 40 After this date, the prisoner was forever barred
from appeals based on new evidence, no matter how exculpatory
the evidence was. 41 After the 21-day period, a judge lost jurisdiction over a case even if he or she "[felt] there [had] been a gross
'42
miscarriage of justice.
In addition to reducing the number of appeals and obtaining
finality in criminal cases, another purpose of post-conviction evidentiary laws is to prevent the use of evidence that has become less
reliable over time. 43 However, the result of restricting all newly
found evidence precludes the use of DNA evidence, which remains
44
highly reliable for decades after a trial.
The drafters of the Act found that DNA testing has emerged as
the "most reliable forensic technique for identifying criminals when
S. 486, tit. I, § 101(a)(8); H.R. 912, tit. I, § 101(a)(8).
See generally, Berlow, supra note 6. The importance of bring finality to
appeals is understood. However, while deadlines are incorporated in order to
keep the judicial system manageable and to prevent prisoners from appealing indefinitely, they can also hinder prisoners who make legitimate albeit untimely appeals. See Steve Mills, Questions of Innocence: Legal Roadblocks Thwart New
Evidence on Appeal, CHIc. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2000, at 1. These circumstances make it
even more difficult for prisoner's trying to prove they were wrongly convicted. Id.
39 See Berlow, supra note 6.
40 Id. See also Francis X. Clines, PardonedInmate's Lawyers Attack Virginia
Evidence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A22. The change in Virginia's statute
of limitations regarding post-conviction DNA testing is further discussed in Part IV
of this Note.
41 Clines, supra note 40.
42 Id.
43 S. 486, tit. I § 101(a)(8), 107 Cong. 1" Sess. (2001); H.R. 912, tit. I,
§ 101(a)(8), 107 Cong. (1St Sess. 2001).
44 Id. See also S. 486 § 101(a)(4); H.R. 912 § 101 (a)(4) (stating "[u]niquely,
DNA evidence showing innocence, produced decades after a conviction, provides
a more reliable basis for establishing a correct verdict than any evidence proffered
at the original trial.").
37
38
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While DNA testing is

commonplace in criminal investigations and trials today, it was not
available to most cases tried before 1994.46 Furthermore, new technology now allows for conclusive testing from minute samples,

which could not have previously been tested. 47 As a result, some
convicted men and women have been exonerated by new DNA
48
tests after earlier testing had proven inconclusive.
The significance of the preclusion of such DNA evidence is
that while DNA testing could, in many cases, conclusively establish
49
guilt or innocence, it is out of the reach for many convicted people
notably those who were convicted before DNA testing technology

was available. 50 As a result, most prisoners with evidence of their
51
innocence can only hope for an executive clemency or pardon.

Prior to 1996, state prisoners had an additional hope for justice
- an appeal to the federal courts. 52 However, Congress under the
1996 Anti Terrorism and Death Penalty Reform Act extinguished
this hope. 53 "In its zeal to achieve finality in death penalty litiga-

tion, Congress eviscerated the great writ of federal habeas corpus,
the mechanism used for almost two hundred years by state prisoners who wanted a federal court to review the justice of their state
S.486, § 101(a)(1); H.R. 912 § 101(a)(1).
S.486, § 101(a)(3); H.R. 912 § 101(a)(3).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
S.486 § 101(a)(8); H.R. 912 § 101(a)(8).
50 See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stevenson). See also S.
486 § 101(a)(8) and H.R. 912 § 101(a)(8) (stating that "[b]ecause DNA testing was
not readily utilized in many jurisdictions until 1994-1995, there are many people
who have been wrongly convicted of crimes in the 1970's and 1980's who are still in
prison. Some of these wrongly convicted prisoners could be exonerated by DNA
testing if a procedural mechanism were available to assist both in facilitating a test
and in providing the necessary relief if the test revealed that the imprisoned applicant was not guilty. While dozens of imprisoned people have already won their
release after DNA testing established their innocence, many others have been
blocked from DNA testing because postconviction remedies are no longer available to them").
51 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218. Requests for clemency, however,
often do not lead to justice. One study showed that many persons believed to be
innocent (by the authors of the study) were refused clemency. See Bedau &
Radelet, supra note 30, at 91, and RADELET, ET. AL., supra note 30, at 5-10. See
also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52
See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218.
53 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See also DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218-219.
45

46

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

110

[Vol. XVIII

decisions. ' 54 Under the 1996 law, condemned prisoners only have
six months after their state appeals to request federal intervention,
55
and one year for other matters.

The purposes of Title I of the Act are to reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions and executions by ensuring the availability of
DNA testing in appropriate cases, 56 to "prevent the imposition of
unconstitutional punishments through the exercise of power
granted by Clause 1 of Section 8 and Clause 2 of Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States and Section 5 of the
57 and to
1 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States",
ensure that persons who are wrongfully convicted have an opportunity to prove their innocence through DNA testing by requiring the
preservation of DNA evidence for a limited period. 58

54 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218-219. See also BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 214 (3rd ed. 1996) (explaining that "[t]he writ of federal habeas

corpus is used to test the unconstitutionality of a state criminal conviction. It
pierces through the formalities of a state conviction to determine whether the conviction is consonant with due process of law"). See also Berlow, supra note 6 (stating that "[t]he radical revision of habeas law was sold to the House of
Representatives by Henry Hyde, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, as the
'Holy Grail" of criminal justice reform, a long-sought change that would address
what he called 'the absurdity, the obscenity' of 'endless appeals' in death-penalty
cases"). Interestingly, at the time of the 1996's enactment, only 1% of all habeas
petitions were from death row prisoners. Id. A full analysis of habeas corpus is
beyond the scope of this Note. For further information, see generally JAMES S.
LIEBMAN

&

RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DURE (3d ed. 1998); DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POST CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF (1996).
55 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 219. A prisoner's hope for federal

relief has been restricted further by the Supreme Court's decision in Herrerra,506
U.S. 390, which is discussed in Part IV.
56
S. 486 § 101(b)(1); H.R. 912 § 101(b)(1).
57 S.486 § 101(b)(2); H.R. 912 § 101(b)(2). See also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, (explaining "[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, (stating
"[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it"); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5, (explaining "[tjhe Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
58 S.486 § 101(b)(3); H.R. 912 § 101(b)(3).
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EFFECT OF THE ACT ON CURRENT FEDERAL LAW

To ensure the availability of post-conviction DNA testing, the
Act would amend Part VI of Title 28 of the United States Code by
inserting Chapter 156-DNA Testing. 59 Within Chapter 156 is proposed Section 2291, DNA Testing. 60 Section 2291 would allow a
person convicted of a Federal crime to apply to the appropriate
Federal court for DNA testing to support the person's claim that he
or she did not commit the Federal crime for which he or she was
convicted 6' or any other offense that a sentencing authority relied
upon when it imposed a sentence of death or an enhanced term of
62
imprisonment for a career offender or armed career offender.
Once an application for DNA testing is made to the court, the
court must notify the government, who has an opportunity to respond. 63 When notice of a convicted person's request is received,
the government shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all
evidence secured in connection with the case that could be subject
to DNA testing is preserved pending the completion of the proceedings. 64 If any evidence is destroyed after an order is issued, the
65
court may impose sanctions such as criminal contempt.
The court shall order DNA testing pursuant to a prisoner's application if it determines that the evidence still exists and in such
condition that testing is possible; 66 the evidence was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing currently requested and that
may resolve an issue which was not resolved by earlier testing;67 the
DNA testing proposed utilizes a valid, scientific technique; 68 and if
the DNA testing proposed can provide new and noncumulative evidence relevant to the prisoner's claim that he or she did not commit
the Federal crime for which he or she was convicted 69 or any other
offense that a sentencing authority relied upon when it imposed a
59 S. 486 § 102(a); H.R. 912 § 102(a).
60

Id.

S. 486
62 S. 486
63 S.486
64 S. 486
156, § 2291(c).
61

§ 102(a) § 2291 (a)(1); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(a)(1).
§ 102(a), §2291 (a)(2); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(a)(2).
§ 102(a), § 2291 (b); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(b).
tit. I, §102(a), chpt. 156, §2291 (c); H.R. 912, tit. I, § 102(a), chpt.

65 Id.

66 S. 486 § 102(a),§ 2291 (d)(1)(A); H.R. 912, tit. I, § 102(a),
§ 2291(d)(1)(A).
67 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(B); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(d)(1)(B).
68 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(C); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(d)(1)(C).
69 S. 486 § 102(a), §2291 (d)(1)(D)(i); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(d)(1)(D)(i).
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sentence of death or an enhanced term of imprisonment for a career offender or armed career offender. 70 The court shall not issue
an order for DNA testing if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the application was raised in order to delay an execution or administration of justice rather than to support
71
a claim of innocence.
The court may order, in the interests of justice, that the cost
incurred by the DNA testing be paid by either the government or
the prisoner. 72 No prisoner will be denied DNA testing due to his
73
or her inability to pay for it.
If the result of the DNA testing is inconclusive, the court may
either order further testing 74 or dismiss the applicant's application.75 If the DNA testing is not in the applicant's favor, the court
shall dismiss the application; 76 assess the applicant for the testing
78 If
costs; 77 and make any further orders as it deems appropriate.
the result of the DNA testing is in the applicant's favor, the court
shall order a hearing and thereafter make additional orders appropriate under applicable post-conviction proceedings. 79
To ensure that biological evidence would be available for postconviction DNA testing, the Act would amend Part IV of Title 28 of
the United States Code by inserting within proposed Chapter 156,
Section 2292, Preservation of Biological Material. 80 Section 2292
would require the government to "preserve all evidence that was
secured in relation to the investigation or prosecution of a Federal
crime ... and that could be subjected to DNA testing, for not less

than the period of time that any person remains subject to incarceration in connection with the investigation or prosecution." 81 The
government may only destroy such evidence before the expiration
of the proscribed time if there is no statute, regulation, court order
70 S. 486 § 102(a),
§ 2291 (d)(1)(D)(ii); H.R. 912 § 102(a),
§ 2291(d)(1)(D)(ii).
71 S.
486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(D)(ii)(2); H.R. 912 § 102(a),
§ 2291(d)(1)(D)(ii)(2).
72 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (e); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(e).
73 Id.
74 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (g)(1); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(1).
75
76

Id.

S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (g)(2)(A); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(2)(A).

S. 486 § 102(a),§ 2291 (g)(2)(B); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(2)(B).
§ 2291(g)(2)(C).
S.486 § 102 a , § 2291 (g)(2)(C); H.R. 912 § 102(a),
§ 102(a), § 2291(g)(3).
79 S. 486 §102(a), § 2291(g)(3); H.R. 912
77

78

80
81

S. 486 § 102 a , §2292; H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292.
S.486 § 102(a), § 2292(a); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(a).
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or any other provision of law that requires the preservation of the
evidence;8 2 the government notifies the incarcerated person and his
or her attorney of its intention to destroy the evidence 8 3 and of the
prisoner's right to DNA testing under the provisions of Chapter 156
to make an application for DNA testing within 180 days; 84 the evidence must be returned to its rightful owner or is unable to be retained by the government in a practical manner;85 and the
government takes reasonable measures to remove and preserve
86
portions of the material to allow future DNA testing.
PART

IV:

EFFECTS OF THE ACT ON STATE LAW

Section 103 of the Act proposes to require that if a state re87
quests funds from the DNA analysis backlog elimination grants,
Paul Coverdell national forensic sciences improvement grants, 88
DNA identification grants,8 9 drug control system improvement
grants, 90 and public safety and community policing grants 91 to develop or improve DNA laboratories or testing, the state must first
certify that it will make post-conviction DNA testing available to
prisoner's convicted of a state crime in a consistent manner as set
forth in §2291 of Title 28 of the United States Code; 92 and that it
will preserve all evidence obtained in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the prisoner that could be subjected to DNA
testing for no less than the time period set forth under §2292 of
93
Title 28 of the United States Code.
Under Section 104 of the Act (Prohibition Pursuant to Section
5 of the 14 h Amendment), a state may not deny a request for DNA
testing made by a person in state custody who has been sentenced
82
83

S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(1); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(1).
S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(A)(i); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(A)(1).

84

Id.

85
86

87
§2.

S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(B)(i); H.R. 912 § 102(a) , § 2292(b)(2)(B)(i).
S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(B)(ii); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(B)(ii).
See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,

88 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
106-561, tit. 1, § BB.
89 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 tit I § X (codified as 42 U.S.C. 3796 §kk et seq. (2000)).
90 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (codified as 42
U.S.C. 3796 § dd et seq. (2001)).
91 See Id.
92 S.486 §103(a)(1); H.R. 912 § 103(a)(1).
93. S.486 § 103(a)(2); H.R. 912 § 103(a)(2).
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to death 94 if the proposed DNA testing has the ability to produce
new and noncumulative evidence material to the prisoner's claim of
innocence 95 regarding the crime for which he or she was sentenced
to death 96 or any other offense that was relied upon during his or
97
her sentencing.
The Act also provides that no state shall enforce a time limit or
procedural default rule to deny a state prisoner under a death sentence the ability to present in state court any new, noncumulative
evidence obtained through DNA testing that establish a "reasonable probability" the he or she did not commit the crime. 98
Opponents of post-conviction DNA testing argue that the requirements set forth in the Act would impose significant burdens on
the states, namely substantial costs and flooded courtrooms. 99
However, states that have enacted legislation similar to the Act
have found these concerns to be unfounded. While providing DNA
testing for indigent prisoners would result in costs to the state, the
relatively modest costs will decline as pre-trial testing becomes
more routine. 10 0 Additionally, as DNA testing would be provided
only to prisoners who meet certain standards - for example, the
evidence was not tested during trial and that such testing would
likely provide probative results - the number of frivolous requests
would be limited. 10 1

S. 486 § 104(a); H.R. 912 § 104(a).
Id.
96
S. 486 § 104(a)(2); H.R. 912 § 104(a)(2).
97 S. 486 § 104(a)(3); H.R. 912 § 104(a)(3).
98 S. 486 § 104(b); H.R. 912 § 104(b).
99 See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt).
100 Id. See also Barry Scheck; DirectorInnocence Project, Cardozo School of
Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2000, at G-5 (stating that the Justice
Department claims that for a typical case, it costs between $2,000 - $5,000 to complete DNA testing). See also Alpert, supra note 15 (quoting Scheck as stating that
"[DNA testing] is a lot cheaper than keeping an innocent person in prison. Costs
for many state prisons average anywhere from $20,000 to $25,000 a year per
inmate").
101 For example, since enacting legislation allowing post-conviction DNA testing four years ago, Illinois has conducted fewer that 100 tests. See Jennifer Warren, Bill Gives Inmates Right to DNA Tests Ok'd; Justice: LegislatorsSend Measure
to Davis on Unanimous Vote; Aim is to Prevent False Imprisonment, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2000, at Al.
94
95
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PART V: CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY FOR
FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Article I of the

14 th

Amendment of the United States Constitu-

tion provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.' 10 2 The 8 th Amendment further protects citizens of the United States from "cruel and unusual

punishments.

10 3

Considering these two provisions, a state's refusal

to review newly found, exculpatory post-conviction evidence because of post-conviction evidentiary time restrictions would violate
10 4
a prisoner's constitutional rights, especially in capital cases.
However, in Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that Texas's refusal to review an inmate's newly

discovered evidence10 5 did .not "transgress a principle of fundamen-

tal fairness 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people',
so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment."10 6 Chief Justice Wil102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. 1.

103 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
104 See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 431 (stating that "[w]e are being asked to decide whether
the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted
and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evidence. Despite the State of Texas' astonishing protestation to the contrary
...
I do not see how the answer can be anything but 'yes"').
105 Before Texas amended its law, in order for a prisoner to obtain a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, he or she must have filed a motion within 30
days after sentencing. See TEX. RULE App. PROC. § 31(a)(1) (1992). The amended
Texas law, which excludes post-conviction DNA testing from the 30-day time period, is further discussed in Part IV of this Note.
106 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407, (quoting the standard set in Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)). Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted of the capital
murder of a police officer and was sentenced to death. He later pled guilty to the
murder of another police officer. After conviction, in a plea for direct review,
Herrera argued that identifications made by one of the police officer's partner had
been improperly admitted. The conviction was upheld. Herrera then unsuccessfully petitioned for state and federal habeas corpus relief. Following the federal
habeas denial, Herrera filed a second petition for state habeas corpus relief. In
this petition, Herrera claimed that his deceased brother had confessed to murdering the police officer. This claim was backed up by affidavits of two other people
including the brother's son who claimed to have witnessed the murder. After
this petition was rejected - and ten years after his conviction - Herrera filed
another federal habeas corpus petition claiming his "actual innocence" of the police officer's murder. Herrera contented that his execution would violate the Federal Constitution under (1) the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
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liam Rehnquist, writing for the majority, further held that "a claim
of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, ' 10 7 and that
"claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence have
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent
an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying
state criminal proceeding." 10 8 A majority of the Court did concede,
however, that it would be unconstitutional for a state to impose a
punishment when there was "a truly persuasive demonstration of
10 9
actual innocence" made after a trial.
Reflecting on the Court's decision in Herrera,it is clear that

federal legislation is necessary and proper to ensure that federal
and state governments will take the appropriate steps in allowing
post-conviction DNA testing and preservation of biological evidence. 10° Unless a state revokes its statute of limitations for postpunishment clause and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The
district court granted Herrera a stay of execution so that his claim of actual innocence and the two affidavits offered in the state petition could be reviewed in
court. On appeal, the appellate court vacated the stay and expressed the view that
newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner was not a
ground for federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari. Herrera was executed in 1993. See America's Death-Penalty Lottery, THE ECONOMIST,
June 10, 2000.
107
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
108 Id. at 401. The Court refers to Chief Justice Warren's decision in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, stating that "[w]here newly discovered evidence is alleged in a habeas application, evidence which could not reasonably have been
presented to the state trier of facts, the federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing. Of course, such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant's detention; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to
the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus." 372
U.S. 293 at 317. (Emphasis added).
109 Herrera,506 U.S. at 404. Note that the Court is stating that it is the punishment that would be unconstitutional, not the lack of ability to prove one's innocence. For a further analysis of Herrera v. Collins and its effect on actual
innocence claims, see generally, Michael J. Muskat, Substantive Justice and State
Interest in the Aftermath of Herrerav. Collins: Findingan Adequate Processfor the
Resolution of Bare Innocence Claims Through State Postconviction Remedies, 75
TEX.

L.

REV.

131 (1996).

110 S. 486 § 101(a)(16) and H.R. 912 § 101(a)(16). In Title I, Section 101 of
the Act, the drafters found that "[g]iven the irremediable constitutional harm that
would result from the execution of an innocent person and the failure of many
States to ensure that innocent persons are not sentenced to death, a Federal statute
assuring the availability of DNA testing and a chance to present the results of
testing in court is a congruent and proportional prophylactic measure to prevent
constitutional injuries from occurring."
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conviction DNA evidence, many prisoners claiming their innocence
with DNA evidence will be caught between state law and the rationale proclaimed in Herrera, and therefore left without further recourse. If fact, many prisoners may find themselves in an
impossible scenario. He or she may know that a DNA test would
prove their innocence, but they are not able to get a hold of the
evidence to be tested - either because state officials refuse to release the evidence or because the evidence has been destroyed.
Even if the evidence was obtained and a DNA test result is found to
be in the prisoner's favor, the state may still refuse to consider it
because of post-conviction evidentiary time restrictions. 1 '
Unless a prisoner can get past the state's restrictions, they have
no hope of constitutional relief from the Supreme Court, because as
the Court stated in Herrera,a "claim of innocence is not a constitutional right." 112 Because the Court will not interfere with a state
law denying the review of evidence found past the statutory time
period, 113 the only way the Supreme Court is willing to help a prisoner with a claim of innocence is if the prisoner already has the
newly found evidence and it is so clearly exculpatory that a state's
keeping of the inmate in prison would be a clear violation of the
11 4
Constitution.
The result is that the prisoner is trapped between a state law
that won't allow the testing of DNA evidence and the Supreme
M1lSee DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 63-73 (discussing the case of Walter
Snyder, a man in Virginia wrongly accused of rape. After spending seven years in
prison, a DNA test proved his innocence. However, because of Virginia's 21-day
evidentiary rule - which, at the time, did not have an exception for DNA evidence - Snyder's only recourse was executive clemency).
112 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
113 For example, see id. at 392 (stating "[b]ecause state legislative judgments
are entitled to substantial deference in the criminal procedure area, criminal process will be found lacking only where it offends some principle of justice so rooted
in tradition and conscience as to be ranked as fundamental. It cannot be said that
the refusal of Texas - which requires a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence to be made within 30 days of imposition or suspension of sentence
- to entertain Herrera's new evidence eight years after his conviction transgresses
a principle of fundamental fairness, in light of the Constitution's silence on the
subject of new trials, the historical availability of new on newly discovered evidence, this Court's amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to impose a time limit for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence,
and the contemporary practice in the States, only nine of which have no time limits
for the filing of such motions").
114 Id. at 401.
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Court decision in Herrerastating that the Court will not review the
case because he or she does not have an exculpatory "colorful
showing of actual innocence." 115 In this case, it is the DNA test
itself that could provide the evidence of innocence, and without it,
16
the prisoner has no chance of federal habeas relief.'
A prime example of the problems a prisoner with a claim of
innocence faces can be seen in the case of Kenneth Charron, a Mis-

souri man who has spent almost 14 years in prison for a conviction
of rape and robbery.117 Charron claims that his innocence could be
proven by submitting evidence to DNA testing, a technology that
was not available to him at the time of his trial.118 The problem
Charron faces, however, is that the evidence is in the custody of the
Circuit Attorney, who refuses to turn the evidence over for testing. 119 Because Missouri law requires that new evidence be submitted within 15 days of conviction, 20 Charron attempted to appeal to
12
the federal courts. 1
Since Charron failed to raise the issue of DNA testing in a
state court and because of the time limits set by the Federal AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which helps
states shorten the appeals process and allows them to limit a prisoner's habeas corpus appeals, the federal courts refused to hear his
22
appeal.'
The Supreme Court claims that when a state prisoner finds
himself or herself with evidence of his or her innocence but is nonetheless precluded by procedural bars from proving it, he or she is
115 Id. at 404.
116 Id.

117 Bill Bryan, Inmate Claims DNA Test Would Set Him Free; But Appeals
Law Blocks His Efforts to Prove It, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1999 at B 1.
118

Id.

119

Id.

120 Science and the Hangman, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 4, 2000, at B2.
121 Bryan, supra note 117.
122 Id. The irony of the Missouri law allowing the Circuit Attorney to withhold the evidence is exacerbated by the fact that Missouri has a state program that

collects blood samples from certain convicts and places the samples into a DNA
database. The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) compares inmate's DNA
with DNA found at unsolved crime scenes. Charron has asked that his blood be
taken, but was refused by state officials who stated "if he wants his DNA tested, he

has to pay for that himself and arrange for that himself." However, the officials did
not elaborate how this was to be done with the evidence in the hands of state
officials. Id.
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not completely left without recourse. 12 3 As a last resort, a prisoner
may request an executive clemency or pardon. 12 4 For a prisoner
with a claim of innocence based on DNA evidence, he or she would
first have to request the governor or pardon board to grant approval for the DNA test, and if the results were in the prisoner's
favor, then he or she must request either a full pardon or new
125
trial.
The idea of putting a claim of innocence - especially a claim
that could be so conclusively proven with DNA - into the hands of
political appointees defiles the entire purpose of the Constitution. 12 6 As defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, a pardon is an "act
Herrera, 506 U.S at 411.
Id. It should be noted that while the Constitution grants the President a
pardon power (Art. I, §2, cl. 1), it does not require the States to enact their own
clemency systems. Id. at 414. See also id., (stating "[e]xecutive clemency has provided the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system"). An in-depth analysis of the
constitutionality, sufficiency and fairness of clemency as the only resort for claims
of innocence is beyond the scope of this Note. For further analysis of this issue, see
generally, Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311
(1996) and Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway to Innocence for
Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1994).
125 DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 218-219. For a further description of
state commutation practices, see Palacios, supra note 124, at 344-347.
126 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id., (stating
that "[w]hatever procedures a State might adopt to hear actual-innocence claims,
one thing is certain: The possibility of executive clemency is not sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The vindication of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution has never been made to turn on the unreviewable discretion of an executive official or administrative tribunal"). See also
Palacios, supra note 124, at 350 (stating that governors are often unwilling to grant
clemency for fear of political repercussions). By 1994, it was clear that Justice
Blackmun had had enough of the death penalty. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "[f]rom this day forward, I no
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more than twenty years, I
have endeavored - indeed, I have struggled - with a majority of this Court, to
develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle
the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the
need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self evident
to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever
can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic
question - does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendant's "deserve" to die? - cannot be answered in the affirmative. It is not simply
that this Court has allowed vague aggravating circumstances to be employed ...
123
124

120
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of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
' 27
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.'
As the dissent in Herrera stated, we no longer live under a government of laws once the exercise of legal rights turns on acts of

grace. 128 "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to es' 129
tablish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.

One must also question whether a governor or a pardon board
is able to make as equal and fair of a determination of one's guilt or
innocence as a judge or jury. 130 One area of concern is whether a
governor has the necessary time available to make a decision as
and vital judicial review to be blocked. The problem is that the inevitability of
factual, legal and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill
some defendants, a system that fails to deliver fair, consistent, and reliable
sentences of death required by the Constitution.").
127 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 413, quoting Chief Justice Marshall's holding in
United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161 (1833).
128 Id. at 441. See also, id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right."
129 Herrera at 441, (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
130 See Erika Casriel, Bush & The Texas Death Machine, ROLLING STONE,
Aug. 3, 2000, at 34 (stating that "[t]estimony revealed that the [Texas Board of
Pardons and Parole] board members handle more than 5,000 parole and pardon
requests a year, since the number of prison inmates grew from 70,000 in 1994 to
150,000 in 1999, with no concurrent increase in parole board staff"). See also Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates' Last Appeals, 37
ARiz. L. REv. 375, 389-98 (1995) (claiming that the Texas pardon boards may not
have the experience or impartiality to render justice); The Innocence Protection
Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before the House Judiciary Committee on
Crime, 106 th Cong. 2"d Sess. (2000) (statement of Congressman Robert C. Scott,
Virginia) (stating that "[t]he notion that the flaws in the system can be addressed
through a governor's clemency process is clearly an inadequate response to a serious problem. Our criminal justice principles are designed to ensure a fair trial for
all accused persons. Ultimate questions of life, death or freedom should not depend upon the politics of the moment or the popularity of the defendant or
whether the governor is in an election campaign, or any such vagary. Furthermore, the governor's office is an inappropriate forum to decide such cases. The
governor has no subpoena power, no right or opportunity to cross examine key
witnesses or to observe witnesses subject to cross examination by advocates familiar with the case. Nor does the governor have other investigatory power necessary
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important as whether someone should be executed or not. 131 For
example, from the time he took office in 1995 through August 2000,
George W. Bush, as the former governor of Texas, approved 135
executions, 132 approximately one death penalty case every two
weeks. 133 By his account, he found time to review every case while
1 34
he was governing Texas and campaigning for the presidency.

In making his decision on whether to grant clemency for a prisoner, former Governor Bush had the help of the eighteen-member

Texas Board of Pardons and Parole.

35

Made up of the Governor's

appointees, the Board votes on all clemency applications and sends

its decisions to the Governor.

36

In a 1998 lawsuit against the

37

Board,
testimony revealed that the board members heard over
5,000 pardon and parole requests a year. 138 While the number of
prison inmates more than doubled in the last six years, no similar
39
increase has been made to the board's staff.'
If the Act is passed, a prisoner with exculpatory evidence of his
or her innocence will no longer be trapped between restrictive state
evidentiary laws and the lack of federal recourse. 40 Instead, the
changes made to state post-conviction evidentiary laws would ensure that a prisoner has the right to test evidence in the hands of the
government, conditional only on the probability of its exculpatory
nature, and not on strict timing requirements.1 41 Also, the requireto ensure fairness. The forum for testing the reliability of evidence is the trial, not
the political forum of the governor's office").
131 See Casriel, supra note 130, at 34.
132 Id. at 29.
133

Id.

See Mintz, supra note 25, In an interview with Tim Russert of NBC's
Meet the Press, Governor Bush was asked if he would "join with Governor Ryan
in invoking a moratorium on any execution of people on death row until the system can be analyzed and through with all the introduction of DNA evidence so
you don't make a mistake?" The Governor's responded "No, I won't. Because
I'm confident that every person that has been put to death in Texas, under my
watch, has been guilty of the crime charged and has [had] full access to the courts
I've reviewed
...
every case that has come across my desk - I'm confident of the
guilt of the person who committed the crime." Id.
135 See Casriel, supra note 130, at 34.
136 Id.
137 The suit claimed that as Texas is the only state which does not hold public
hearings for capital case clemency cases, it thereby violated due process and open
meeting laws. Id.
134

138
139

140
141

Id.

Id
S. 486 § 101 and H.R. 912 § 101.
See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stevenson).
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ment under the Act which would preserve all biological evidence
for the length of a prisoner's sentence 142 would ensure that a prisoner would be able to prove his or her claim of innocence through
DNA testing without the concern that the state could destroy the
143
evidence at any time.
The Act would also move the determination of guilt or innocence back into the proper hands of the judicial system. 44 The provisions of the Act would give a prisoner the right to prove his or her
innocence in court 45 rather then plead their case to governors, who
are often preoccupied with official state business, or clemency
boards with case loads beyond their means.146
PART

VI:

SIMILAR STATE LEGISLATION

If passed, the Act would require the states to adopt legislation
equal to the changes made to the federal law.' 47 Many states, realizing the important role DNA testing plays in the pursuit of justice,
have passed statutes to guide the courts on DNA requests made by
inmates. 48 For example, arguments in favor of giving inmates
more access to DNA testing were successful in Arizona, Oklahoma
and Tennessee, but only for those prisoners receiving a sentence of
death or life imprisonment. 14 9 Similar legislation was passed in
150
Washington, but only applies to those sentenced to death.
At the end of 2000, only three states - New York, Illinois and
California - had laws giving inmates the right to post-conviction
15 1
DNA testing equal in breadth to what the Act would provide.
During the first half of 2001, several states have adopted similar
legislation.1 52 The most notable states to adopt the legislation are
142 S. 486 § 102, § 2292 and H.R. § 102, § 2292.
143 See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stevenson).
144 See DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 219. See also generally Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430-446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 See generally Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146 See Casriel, supra note 130.
147 See Rovella, supra note 14. See also notes 59-86 and accompanying text.
148 See Lazar, supra note 7.
149 See supra note 20.
150

Id.

151 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30 (1994), ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3

(1997), and CAL. PEN. CODE § 1405 (2001). See also Erin Hallissy, Charlie Goodyear, Davis Signs Bill to Allow DNA Testing for Inmates, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29,
2000 at Al.
152 See generally Hansen, supra note 7.
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Texas and Virginia, who have fought long and hard to keep strict
statutes of limitations regarding post-conviction evidence.
PIONEERING STATES

A.

New York

In 1994, the New York State Legislature amended New York
Criminal Procedure Law 440.30 to authorize post-conviction DNA
testing in certain circumstances. 153 The statute requires a court to
grant a prisoner's request for post-conviction DNA testing if the
court makes two determinations.1 54 First, the court must find that
"the specified evidence containing DNA was secured in connection
with the trial resulting in the judgment."'1 55 Second, if a DNA test
had been conducted on such evidence and the results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, the court must determine that "there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict
1 56
would have been more favorable to the defendant."'
New York has found that "a statutory right to post-conviction
DNA testing, coupled with an appropriate standard, can produce
results both just and practical. '157 In fact, since the enactment of
the statute, more than seven people were exonerated by post-con158
viction DNA testing.
Not only has NYCPL 440.30 been found to be effective, it has
also proven to critics of post-conviction DNA testing legislation
that a statutory right to the testing will not cause an avalanche of
appeals and delays. 159 By restricting post-conviction DNA testing
to cases where the results would be clearly exculpatory, New York
has managed to keep the number of appeals based on the testing to
a workable number. 16o As stated above, under the New York law,
requests for post-conviction DNA testing will only be granted if
153 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30.

See also Hearings (statement of Eliot

Spitzer), supra note 18.

154 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30.
155 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30. The New York law, in fact, is the model

for the Act. See Christi Daugherty, Freedom in a Genetic Fingerprint: DNA Testing Can Overturn Convictions, but There are Serious Iniquities in the Law, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 22, 2000 at 22.
156 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
157 Id.

159

Id. See also DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9.
See Hearings (statement of Honorable William D. Delahunt), supra note

160

See Hearings (statement of Eliot Spitzer), supra note 18.

158
5.

§440.30.
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there is "reasonable probability" that the verdict would have been
more favorable to the defendant had the results been admitted at
trial. 161 A court would reject a request for testing when it had determined that "there was not a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant even with
'162
the results of a DNA test.
New York's law enforcement community has also been supportive of the value of DNA testing. 163 Referencing post-conviction DNA testing, former New York Police Commissioner Howard
Safir stated that he has "seen the immense value of DNA evidence
as both an inculpatory and exculpatory tool for law enforcement,"'1 64 and that the "existence of a statutory requirement [for
post-conviction DNA testing] makes a significant difference in the
1 65
pursuit of justice."'
B.

Illinois

Like New York, Illinois has a statute allowing inmates to request post-conviction DNA testing.1 66 So far, under its law, fourteen Illinois prisoners have been exonerated.1 67 Enacted in 1997,
Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure §116-3 is drawn narrowly. 168
Similar to the New York law, prisoners must meet a certain criteria
for the law to apply.1 69 An inmate's conviction must have occurred
before DNA technology was used in criminal investigations meaning that the statute would only be useful for crimes committed
more than 10 years ago. 170 Furthermore, the conviction has to be
161 Id. As an example of the selectivity of the statute, Spitzer discussed Matter of Washpon, 164 Misc.2d 991 (Kings County 1995). In Washpon, a rape case,
the court ordered post-conviction DNA testing because the victim had testified
that she had not had sex with anyone but the rapist on the night of the crime. Id.
162 Id. As an example of the selectivity of the statute, Spitzer discussed People v. Kellar, 218 A.D.2d 406 (3d Dept 1996). In Kellar, a rape case, the court
rejected a request for post-conviction DNA testing where the defendant had conceded that he had sex with the victim, but that it had been consensual. In this case,
the results of the DNA test would not have changed the verdict. Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
167

See Mintz, supra note 25.

168 See A Test for Innocence, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE,
169 Id.
170 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.

Dec. 27, 1999, at 6B.
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based solely on witness identification. 171 Finally, the evidence to be
tested must have been in the custody of law enforcement from the
172
time of trial.
Also similar to the New York law, the Illinois law will not allow
post-conviction DNA testing if there is "substantial corroborating
evidence of guilt."'1 73 For example, if a convict was identified as a
rapist by the victim and then confessed to the crime or claimed that
the sex was consensual, the convict would not be entitled to have
174
his case reopened under the DNA testing statute.
The Illinois law also contains safeguarding provisions to reduce
the number of frivolous requests filed by otherwise qualifying prisoners. 175 For example, a prisoner found to have made an unjustified motion under §116-3 could jeopardize his or her credit for time
1 76
served.
C.

California

On September 28, 2000, Governor Gray Davis of California
signed legislation allowing post-conviction DNA testing. 177 Like
the New York and Illinois statutes, California Penal Code §1405
allows convicted felons to seek DNA testing in order to establish a
claim of innocence and demonstrate that genetic evidence could
have affected the outcome of his or her trial. 178 Although passed
too recently to examine the effects of the new law, it is inevitable
that many cases will be overturned based on post-conviction DNA
179
evidence.
171 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3. For further discussion of the validity of
witness identification, see generally Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven D. Penrod &
Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense
Evaluations,3 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 338 (1997) and DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9,
at 41-77.
172 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 David Heckelman, Edgar OK's Measure for DNA, Other Tests, CHICAGO
DAILY BULLETIN, Jul. 23, 1997, at 1.
176
ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
177 See CAL. PEN. CODE §1405 (2001). See also Hallissy et. al., supra note
151.
178 See Howard Mintz, New Law Could Affect Hundredsof Inmates, THE SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000.
179 Id. (stating "[b]ecause DNA technology generally was not introduced into
the state's criminal justice system until about 1993, there are possibly hundreds of
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Under the California law, a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment may make a motion requesting DNA testing before the
trial court that entered his or her conviction. 180 The motion, verified under oath by the prisoner, must explain why the identity of
the perpetrator should have been a significant issue in his or her
trial. 181 Additionally, the prisoner's motion must explain how the
requested DNA testing would raise a "reasonable probability" that
he or she would have had more favorable results at trial.182 Finally,
the evithe prisoner must make a reasonable attempt to identify
183
sought.
testing
DNA
of
type
the
and
tested
dence to be
Based upon the success of the post evidentiary laws passed in
New York and Illinois - and the potential success of the California
law - it is clear that the provisions of the Act would help other
states in reducing the risk of imprisoning or executing an innocent
man or woman. 184 Since New York and Illinois enacted laws allowing post conviction DNA testing, 21 wrongfully convicted prisoners have been released from their prisons. 185 If the rest of the
states adopt the provisions of the Act, it is evident that this number
would dramatically rise.
WELCOMED ADDITIONS

Several states have been adamant in keeping a short and strict
statute of limitations regarding post-conviction evidence, making
post-conviction DNA testing nearly impossible. 86 As a result, several prisoners claiming their innocence have come close to being
87
executed while ultimately exonerated because of DNA evidence1
Recently, two states with the strictest post-conviction evidentiary
defendants in California prisons who now will have a specific mechanism for putting their claims of innocence to the scientific test").
180 See
181 See
182 See
183 See

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.

PEN.
PEN.
PEN.
PEN.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

§1405(a) (2001).
§1405 (a)(1).
§1405(a)(2).
§1405(a)(3).

184 See generally Hearings(statement of Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General), supra note 18. See also generally The Innocence Protection Act of
2000: Hearingson H.R. 4167 Before the House JudiciaryCommittee on Crime, 10 6th
Cong. (2"d Sess. 2000) (statement of George H. Ryan, Governor of Illinois).
185 See Hearings (statement of Eliot Spitzer) supra note 18. See also Mintz,
supra note 25.
186 See Science and the Hangman, supra note 120.
187

See id.
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laws have passed laws similar to the provisions of the Act and Virginia.
A.

127
Texas

Texas

Nowhere was the need for legislation similar to the Act greater
than in Texas, which leads all other states in executions. 188 On
April 5, 2001, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed legislation that
removes post-conviction DNA testing from the state's 30-day postconviction evidentiary statute of limitations.1 89 Under the new legislation, Texas must insure the preservation of biological evidence
that was in the possession of the state during the prosecution of the
case' 90 that might establish the identity of the person who committed the offence or any element of the offense for which the prisoner
was convicted. 9 1 In capital cases, the evidence must be preserved
until the inmate is executed, dies, or released on parole. 92 In noncapital cases, the evidence must be preserved until the prisoner
93
dies, completes his or her sentence, or is released.
If a convicted prisoner wants to access evidence for DNA testing, under the new Texas law, the prisoner may submit a motion to
the court if the evidence was secured in relation to the conviction
being challenged19 4 and is in the possession of the state during the
trial.' 95 Additionally, the evidence must not have been previously
196
subjected to DNA testing because DNA testing was not available
or, if the evidence was previously tested, it may be re-tested subject
to new techniques that provide a "reasonable likelihood" of more
197
accurate results.
Before the adoption of the new legislation, Texas law required
that in order to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a prisoner had to file a motion within 30 days of his or her
188
As of August 31, 2001, 731 men and women have been executed in the
United States since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976. Death Penalty
Information Center, supra note 2. As of June 1, 2001, Texas had executed 246
people - more that a third of the national total. Jim Yardley, Texas Set to Shift in
Wake of Furoron Death Penalty, N. Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at Al.
189 TEX. RULE CRIM . P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (2001).
190 TEX. RULE GRIM .P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (B)(1) (2001).
191 TEX. RULE CRIM P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (B)(2) (2001).
192 TEX. RULE CRIM .P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (C)(1) (2001).
194

TEX. RULE CRIM
TEX. RULE CRIM

193
195

Id.

196

TEX. RULE CRIM

197

TEX. RULE CRIM

.P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (C)(2) (2001).
.P. tit. 1, ch. 64, art. 64.01 (B) (2001).
.P. tit. 1, ch. 64, art. 64.01 (Bll(2001).
.P. tit. 1, ch. 64, art. 64.01
(B
2 2001).
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sentencing. 198 Because of this strict evidentiary rule, prisoners
found it nearly impossible to obtain post-conviction DNA testing
and could only hope for clemency or a pardon. 199
An example of the power of post-conviction DNA testing can
be seen in the case of A.B. Butler, Jr. who was pardoned by former
Texas Governor George W. Bush in May of 2000 after spending 17
years in prison for a crime he did not commit.2 00 Serving a 99-year
sentence for rape and kidnapping, Butler learned in 1990 of the
FBI's use of DNA testing. 20 1 He then unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain a DNA test for seven years but was continually barred by
Texas' post-evidentiary laws. 20 2 Only after obtaining the help of
Centurion Ministries, a New Jersey based group that helps free the
20 4
wrongfully convicted, 20 3 did Texas officials consent to the testing.
While Butler was ultimately exonerated, the amount of time he
spent in jail would have been drastically reduced had Texas allowed
exculpatory post-conviction evidence to be entered beyond its 30day limit. Under the provisions Texas' new legislation, Butler
would have received DNA testing shortly after learning of its availability - not 10 years later.
B.

Virginia

In February of 1999, the General Assembly of Virginia rejected
legislation that would extend Virginia's "21-day rule" for hearing
new evidence after sentencing.2 05 However, a reintroduced bill was
passed by the House and Senate and ultimately signed into law by
Governor James Gilmore on May 5, 2001.206 Under the new legislation, all biological evidence collected or obtained during the prosecution of a prisoner who was convicted of a felony but not
TEX. RULE App. PROC. § 31(a)(1) (1992).
199 See Science and the Hangman, supra note 120.
200 See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Peter Neufeld).
201 See Sharon Cohen and Paul Shepard, Law, Science at Odds over DNA
Evidence, THE SUNDAY GAZEtTE MAIL, Oct. 8. 2000, at 4A.
202 See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Peter Neufeld).
203 See Cohen and Shepard, supra note 201.
204 See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Peter Neufeld).
205 See The Case for Inhocence: Four Cases, Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/cases/, (visited Oct. 25, 2000). At 21 days, Virginia's evidence limit was the strictest in the nation. See also Clines, supra note 40.
206 See generally Michael Sluss and Laurence Hammack, Gilmore Ends DNA
Time Limit; 'People Who are Wrongly Convicted Must Have a Fair Opportunity to
Prove Their Innocence', ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, May 3, 2001, at Al.
198
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sentenced to death must be preserved for fifteen years.20 7 The
court, in its discretion, may order that the evidence be retained for
a longer period. 20 8 In cases involving a death sentence, all biologi20 9
cal evidence must be retained until the judgment is executed.
The new legislation also allows a convicted prisoner to apply
for a new scientific investigation of any biological evidence related
to his or her conviction if: the evidence was not known or available
at the time of conviction 210 or the evidence was not tested because
the technology was not available at the time of conviction;211 the
evidence is subject to "a chain of custody sufficient to establish that
the evidence has not been altered, tampered with, or substituted"; 212 the testing is "materially relevant, noncumulative, and
necessary" in proving the prisoner's innocence; 213 the testing involves a method employed by the Division of Forensic Science; 21 4
and the prisoner has not reasonably delayed the filing of the peti215
tion for testing.
While the new law will be welcomed by Virginia prisoners who
claim they can prove their innocence through DNA testing, it is too
late to help Joseph Roger O'Dell, who was executed in July of
1997.216 O'Dell was arrested in 1985 for murder, rape and sodomy. 217 He was convicted of these crimes based mainly on blood
evidence and testimony of a jailhouse "snitch. '218 After his conviction and sentence of death, O'Dell made unsuccessful appeals to
the Virginia Supreme Court, Virginia Federal District Court, and
the U.S. Supreme Court. 219 During the U.S. Supreme Court appeal, Justice Harry Blackmun dissented by stating that there were
"serious questions as to whether O'Dell committed the crime" and
warned of "the gross injustice that would result if an innocent man
were sentenced to death." 220
207
209
210

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(A) (2001).
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(B).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(I).

211

Id.

212
213

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(II).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(III).

214
215
216

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(IV).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(V).
See Four Cases, supra note 205.

208

217
218
219
220

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After his conviction, O'Dell learned of the availability of DNA
testing and began petitioning the Virginia Circuit Court for the release of evidence for testing. 22 1 O'Dell's requests were denied, and

he was executed in

1997.222

Questioning his guilt, several anti-

death penalty groups continued to push for DNA testing even after
O'Dell's death. 223 The courts denied their requests and "suggested
that the evidence be disposed of as required by law. '224 In March
of 2000, without ever being submitted for DNA testing, the evidence that could have settled all of the questions regarding O'Dell's
22 5
guilt or innocence was destroyed.
Not all Virginia inmates who were denied post-conviction
DNA testing were as unlucky as O'Dell. Earl Washington, Jr., a
mentally retarded farmhand, was pardoned in September of 2000
2 26
after spending 17 years in prison for a murder he did not commit.
During most of those 17 years, Washington's lawyers struggled to
prove his innocence through DNA evidence. 227 Washington was
within nine days of his execution in 1994 when his death sentence
was commuted to life by Governor L. Douglas Wilder. 228 The Governor commuted the sentence when an initial DNA test raised
doubts about Washington's guilt. 229 Washington was pardoned because state officials insisted that the test was not fully conclusive.2 30
After pushing for six years for additional DNA testing, a new test
proved that it was a known convicted rapist that had actually com231
mitted the crime.
This was where Washington's luck ran out. Wilder refused to
also recommend parole for a separate assault conviction Washington received which carried a 30-year sentence. 232 State officials are
recalculating his remaining sentence to see whether he may now be
eligible for parole. 233 Washington's lawyers contend that had he
not been wrongfully convicted on the murder charge, he would
221

See Four Cases, supra note 205.

222

Id.

223

Id.
Id.

224
225

Id.

226

See Clines, supra note 40.

227

Id.

228

Id.

229

Id.

230

Id.
See Clines, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.

231
232

233
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have been released from jail on the assault charge due to good be234
havior several years ago.
PART

VI: CONCLUSION

It is clear that without federal legislation requiring the availability of post-conviction DNA testing and the preservation of evidence, the integrity of our current system of justice will continue to
suffer. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental premise of
the American criminal justice system. 235 If we do not take all appropriate measures necessary to fairly, efficiently and justly determine one's guilt or innocence, this premise is severely undermined.
Without the safeguards provided for in the Act, more prisoners
claiming their innocence will be left with executive clemency or pardon as their only hope for justice.
If the Act is passed, a prisoner with exculpatory evidence of his
236
innocence will be able to present that evidence to a court of law.
Not only would a prisoner with proof of his or her innocence be
exonerated of the crimes for which he or she was convicted, but it is
possible that such testing would lead to the determination of the
person who actually committed the crime.
While critics are quick to raise the possibility of flooded courtrooms
and high costs of DNA testing, their claims are quickly refuted by
looking to the states which have adopted measures similar to those
provided for in the Act.237 However, even if the courts would be
busy hearing cases previously settled years ago and states would be
forced to pay for DNA testing for indigents, these problems should
not be more troubling than the risk of executing an innocent man or
2 38
woman.
It is highly doubtful that the Framers of the Constitution would
have considered overburdened courts and potential costs involving
239
evidentiary testing to outweigh a person's due process rights.
234
235
236
237

Id.

See Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Eliot Spitzer).
See generally DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 218-219.
See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Honorable William D.
Delahunt).
238 See Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Eliot Spitzer) (stating "[t]he
United States always has demonstrated its basic commitment of fairness to the

accused, and therefore any marginal burdens are far outweighed by the ability to
prevent the punishment of the innocent").
239 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

132

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.

[Vol. XVIII

The United States has taken much pride on the fairness and accuracy of its Constitution and criminal justice system. Although the
United States is one of the last modern countries still endorsing the
death penalty, 240 by adopting the Act, the U.S. can continue to enforce its laws and punishments, but in a more fair and accurate
24
manner. '
Rochelle L. Haller

240 See, e.g., Yoffie, supra note 27 (stating that "[t]he United States is the only
Western democracy that still carries out executions. Since 1976, 41 other countries
have abolished the death penalty").
241 See, e.g., New Survey Shows Overwhelming Majority Supports Changes to
Death Penalty: Democratic and Republican Lawmakers Release Poll Showing 80%
Support Reform to Capital Punishment System (visited Oct. 25, 2000) http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml, (visited Oct. 25, 2000) (quoting
Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) as stating "[t]he Innocence Protection Act will
achieve [the ideal of equal justice for all] by employing out most advanced scientific knowledge and by requiring competent legal counsel in capital cases. Most
importantly, the Innocence Protection Act accomplishes this without weakening
law enforcement's ability to capture, try, and, if necessary, execute those who are
truly guilty.").

